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ELECTION NIGHT IN A MARIJUANA SUPERMARKET
It was 7:45 p.m. on Election Day, 1996. The thousands of people assembled in
and around the Cannabis Buyers Club (CBC) on San Francisco’s Market Street were
eager for the polls to close in fifteen minutes so they could start smoking weed.1
The crowd had gathered for a victory party celebrating the expected passage of
California Proposition 215, the “California Compassionate Use Act of 1996.” If
enacted, this initiative would be the first state law in the United States to legalize the
use of marijuana for medical purposes. Dennis Peron—the founder and director of
the CBC—would later remember: “Our freedom itself was on the ballot . . . . The
entire planet was watching.”2
Many of the partygoers had been ready to light up triumphal joints for hours, but
Peron pleaded that they keep their pot in their pockets until 8:00 p.m. Although polls
showed broad support for medical marijuana, Californians overwhelmingly opposed
recreational use of the drug. Peron later explained, “We just didn’t want . . . live
television pictures of folks ‘getting high’ being the last thing people saw before
going out to vote.”3
In each of the two previous years, the California legislature had passed a bill
legalizing medical use of marijuana, only to see Governor Pete Wilson veto it. Peron
had thus decided to take the issue directly to the people. He had co-drafted
Proposition 215, an initiative immune from gubernatorial veto, and started the
successful drive to obtain enough signatures to get it in on the ballot. The measure
explicitly recognized that Californians had “a right to obtain and use marijuana for
medical purposes” when a physician recommended they do so for treatment of
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“cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other
illness for which marijuana provides relief.”4 Proposition 215 declared that state
prohibitions on the possession and cultivation of marijuana would not apply to such
patients or their primary caregivers and that no physician would be sanctioned in any
way for making such a recommendation. 5
Until very recently, the sprawling building where the celebrants gathered had
housed the largest non-clandestine marijuana distributor in the country. Peron had
founded the Cannabis Buyers Club in 1993 to serve the growing population of San
Franciscans seeking pot for medical uses. From its inception, many of the CBC’s
customers were fighting AIDS, an epidemic savaging the largely gay Castro District
where the dispensary was initially located. At its current site just northeast of the
Castro, the CBC had become an important social center. People with AIDS and other
diseases filled the high-ceilinged interior with marijuana smoke while sharing
medical information and emotional support. Since mid-2015, the building had also
served as the de facto headquarters of Californians for Compassionate Use, Peron’s
pro-Proposition 215 organization.
Then, on August 4, 1996, three months before the election, one hundred armed
California narcotics agents raided the CBC on orders from Dan Lungren, the state’s
conservative and politically ambitious attorney general. They seized more than 150
pounds of pot and interrogated the few staffers and patients who happened to be
there on a Sunday, the only day the club was closed. On Monday, state authorities
obtained a court injunction closing the facility.
The following evening, more than 500 furious protesters marched through the city
with signs bearing slogans such as “Marijuana is Medicine” and “Defend Your Right
to Smoke Weed.”6 A week later, patient activists conducted a mock public trial of
Lungren and then marched to the attorney general’s office, where the jury delivered
its “guilty” verdict.7
Meanwhile, Peron continued to run his Proposition 215 campaign from a secondfloor office within the shuttered CBC. One day in October, state authorities arrested
and indicted him for the possession and sale of marijuana. He and his comrades
implemented a successful media strategy portraying Lungren as a heartless politico.
Even cartoonist Garry Trudeau joined the conversation, with a series of sympathetic
Doonesbury comic strips. In one, the perpetual pothead Zonker bemoans the buyers’
club bust, and his friend responds, “Well, if Proposition 215 is approved, it’ll never
happen again.”8
On Election Day, November 5, political prognosticators were predicting not only
victory for Proposition 215, but also the re-election of Democratic President Bill
Clinton. The celebrants at the CBC were far less ebullient about the latter prospect,
however. As a candidate in 1992, the slick Arkansan had claimed that he tried
4 Initiative Measure to be Submitted Directly to the Voters (Proposition 215) (proposing the
addition of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 to the California Health and Safety Code).
5

Id.
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500 S.F. Protestors Protest Closure of Cannabis Club, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1996, at A22; Dan
Reed & Alan Gathright, Pot Supporters Take to the Streets Over Raid. Demonstrators Call State Move
“Political,” SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 6, 1996, at 10A.
7 Press Release, Californians for Medical Rights, Jury of Medical Marijuana Patients Delivers
“Guilty” Verdicts, Personal Pleas to Attorney General Lungren (Oct. 15, 1996) (on file with author).
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marijuana once but “didn’t inhale.” During his first four years in office, President
Clinton had been no defender of pot. He had signed the 1994 Crime Bill and
overseen a consequent surge in marijuana arrests.9 His Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) had spurned requests to reclassify marijuana from Schedule I
to Schedule II under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to make it more readily
available for research and medical use. Clinton’s Department of Health and Human
Services had refused to revive a compassionate-use Investigational New Drug
program for marijuana cigarettes that the George H. W. Bush administration had
discontinued in 1992.10 Clinton’s drug czar, Barry McCaffrey, had even flown to
California to campaign against Proposition 215. He had warned that the measure was
a “stalking horse for [full] legalization” and had condemned the use of “Cheech and
Chong logic to guide our thinking about medicine.”11
At 8:00, Peron announced that the polls were officially closed and immediately, in
his own words, “lit up a big fat joint.”12 He puffed away for the news cameras with a
broad smile. The crowd followed his example, and soon smoke was pouring out of
the CBC’s open windows, along with drumbeats and triumphant whoops. This
festive use of marijuana was unusual for the many celebrants who ordinarily smoked
it to relieve the symptoms of serious diseases, such as AIDS and cancer. But the
throng also included at least some people like Phil Harris, who told a journalist, “I
get high because—gosh—life kind of sucks.”13
By 11:00 p.m., it was clear that Proposition 215 would pass. The revelry
continued into the early hours of Wednesday morning. The final tally would show
that 55.6 percent of California voters voted “yes.”14 The initiative’s passage (along
with that of a similar measure in Arizona the same day) triggered a wave of state
medical marijuana legalization laws that, by 2019, would encompass 33 states and
the District of Columbia.
Following the election, newspapers around the country published AP photographs
of Peron gleefully toking at the victory party. These images outraged Proposition
215’s opponents. A letter to the editor published in the San Bernardino County Sun
raged: “The joy on [Peron’s] face . . . and the absence of any mention of disease . . .
send a harmful message to youth about this dangerous drug. What was passed on the
premise of aiding people who painfully suffer from a chronic disease . . . now
appears to be a license allowing people to smoke marijuana for pleasure.”15
Then, on November 19, the New York Times quoted Peron opining: “I believe all
marijuana use is medical—except for kids.”16 His logic: because stress relief is a
9
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10
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11

Carey Goldberg, Medical Marijuana Use Winning Backing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1996, at A12.

12

PERON & ENTWISTLE, supra note 1, at loc. 3729–33.

13

Happy Smoker (photo), DESERT SUN, Nov. 6, 1996, at 13; Prop. 215 Faces Many Questions,
DESERT SUN, Nov. 7, 1996, at 6; Voters Say Marijuana Should be Legal Medicine, UKIAH DAILY J., Nov.
6, 1996, at 10.
14 California Proposition 215, The Medical Marijuana Initiative (1996), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_215,_the_Medical_Marijuana_Initiative_(1996).
15
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medical purpose, any adult who uses cannabis does so for medical reasons. Peron
became so identified with this statement that it could have been his epitaph when he
died in January 2018.
Peron’s proclamation infuriated many. To Proposition 215’s enraged opponents, it
confirmed that the initiative’s true purpose was to enable recreational use. Peron’s
statement also incensed people who had supported the proposition believing it to be a
genuine medical measure intended to help people with serious illnesses. Californians
for Medical Rights (CMR), a well-funded advocacy organization that had run a
polished pro-Proposition 215 campaign alongside Peron’s grass-roots effort, voiced
this view. It quickly issued a press release challenging Peron: “The truth is, the new
law applies to relatively few people, under very specific circumstances”17 Bill
Zimmerman, CMR’s chief, was blunter. He told the Washington Post that the real
danger to the new law was not federal officials, but “crazies from our own side,” like
Peron, who viewed the initiative “as a wedge to legalizing recreational use of
marijuana.”18
Intriguingly, many proponents of legal recreational use were also irritated by
Peron’s “all marijuana use is medical” declaration. The leadership of the National
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), the most prominent fulllegalization advocacy group, was aghast. Although medical-marijuana-only
measures fell far short of NORML’s ultimate goal, it had diligently backed them
since 1972 and had actively supported Proposition 215.19 In NORML’s view,
Peron’s post-victory language not only muddied the arguments for full legalization,
but also seemed to disregard the use of marijuana for pure pleasure. Peron thus
widened an already-existing rift within the marijuana advocacy community. As we
will see, this fissure between supporters of medical marijuana and proponents of full
legalization endures today.
In some ways, the medical marijuana movement is similar to other movements for
freedom of therapeutic choice that I consider in my forthcoming book with Oxford
University Press, Choose Your Medicine: Freedom of Therapeutic Choice in
America. But the fact that marijuana has an alternative, commonly condemned nonmedical use—provision of a recreational high—has engendered some profound
differences. Pot’s widespread recreational use has shaped the tactics and language of
medical cannabis proponents and generated fierce intra-movement disputes. Dennis
Peron, a hippie stoner genuinely dedicated to helping ill people find relief, embodied
all of the ambiguities inherent in marijuana itself.

THE MEDICAL ALCOHOL PRECEDENT
Marijuana is not, of course, the only mind-altering substance with both therapeutic
and recreational uses. American law wrestled with the appropriate regulation of
another dual-use product—alcohol—from the 1830s through the end of national
prohibition in 1933. Almost every one of the legal and policy arguments that would

17 Press Release, Californians for Medical Rights, Responsible Guidelines for Marijuana Patients
Issued (1996) (on file with author).
18 William Claiborne & Roberto Suro, Medicinal Marijuana Brings Legal Headache, WASH. POST,
Dec. 5, 1996, at A1.
19 It’s Official! California Voters Will Decide on Medical Marijuana Issue this Fall, 2 FREEDOM @
NORML, 1996, at 1.
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later arise in the context of medical marijuana were foreshadowed in this
longstanding debate.
In the nineteenth century, American physicians frequently prescribed alcoholic
beverages as a treatment for many conditions, ranging from snake bites to
rheumatism to pneumonia. The 1864 (4th) edition of the U.S. Pharmacopoeia listed
brandy, whisky, sherry wine, and port wine.20 Doctors also recommended the
consumption of gin and malt liquors. Nonetheless, many states, at various times,
banned the medical use of such products along with other uses. They either
prohibited the prescription of intoxicating liquor altogether or allowed it only if the
liquor was rendered unfit as a beverage.21
Some early state judicial decisions upheld stringent restrictions on the distribution
of alcohol for medical purposes. For example, in 1849, Massachusetts’ highest court
held that even in a dire situation, an unlicensed retailer could not sell “spirituous
liquors” pursuant to a physician’s prescription, “however strong a necessity there
might be for the buyer’s using it as medicine, or for the preservation of health.”22
Around mid-century, however, state courts almost uniformly began to strike down
complete bans on the sale of alcoholic beverages for medical use. For instance, in
1854, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a physician who sold a
glass of brandy to a patient, holding that the jury should have been instructed to
acquit the defendant if “he really administered the liquor to a diseased person, as a
medicine, upon his professional judgment of its necessity.”23 Courts read exceptions
for medical use into prohibition laws based on the longstanding canon that statutes
must be interpreted so as to avoid absurdity and injustice. Conveniently enough, the
classic example of this interpretive principle, cited by multiple American courts,
concerned the practice of medicine: a medieval Bolognese court ruled that a law
mandating severe punishment for “drawing blood in the street” did not apply to a
surgeon who opened the vein of a person suffering from a fit.24
In 1885, a Kentucky court suggested that a medical exception was constitutionally
required. “[W]hile the legislature has the power to regulate the sale of liquors to be
used as beverage, or to prohibit its sale for that purpose altogether, it cannot exercise
that power so arbitrarily as to prohibit the use or sale of it as medicine.”25 Legal
scholar Ernst Freund, in an influential 1904 treatise, cited this case to support his
assertion that a medical exception to prohibition was a “constitutional necessity,
since the state could not validly prohibit the use of valuable curative agencies on
account of a remote possibility of abuse.”26

20

THE PHARMACOPOEIA OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 51, 52, 55 (4th ed. 1864).

21

At the time of the ratification of the 18th Amendment, more than half of the states banned the
prescription of alcoholic beverages. See Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 590 n. 2 (1926).
22 Commonwealth v. Sloan, 58 Mass. 52, 54 (1849); see also Commonwealth v. Kimball, 41 Mass.
366 (1837).
23

State v. Larrimore, 19 Mo. 391, 392 (1854).

24

Donnell v. State, 2 Ind. 658, 659 (1851); State v. Wray, 72 N.C. 253, 255 (1875); Ball v. State, 50
Ind. 595, 597 (1875).
25

Sarris v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 327, 331 (1885) (dictum).

26

ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 210–11
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But Freund’s position was already obsolete when he penned it. Notwithstanding
the Kentucky decision, most courts considering the issue after 1880 actually rejected
the need to read a medical exception into state and local prohibition laws. They
concluded that the legislatures in question had intentionally omitted such exceptions
and, moreover, that these omissions, far from being absurd, were justifiable. For
example, in 1881, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a
physician who had prescribed and sold alcoholic “bitters” to a patient for treatment
purposes. “[T]here is no exception made in the statute in favor of physicians,
druggists, or any other persons whomsoever, and this court cannot engraft one in
their favor without the exercise of legislative power, which it does not possess.”27
The court remarked that in light of potential abuse of such an exception, its omission
may have signified “sagacious foresight” by the General Assembly.28
In the early twentieth century, orthodox doctors increasingly expressed doubt
about alcohol’s value as medicine.29 The 1916 (9th) edition of the U.S.
Pharmacopoeia omitted alcoholic beverages altogether. In 1917, the American
Medical Association (AMA) passed a resolution stating that because alcohol’s “use
in therapeutics . . . has no scientific value,” its “use . . . as a therapeutic agent should
be further discouraged.”30 Not coincidentally, elite physicians also tended to support
temperance; the same resolution condemned the use of alcohol as a beverage because
it was “detrimental to the human economy.”31
Nevertheless, in 1919, when the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
(banning the sale, manufacture, and distribution of alcoholic beverages) was ratified,
many doctors still prescribed alcohol. According to a 1921 survey by the Journal of
the American Medical Association, a slight majority of American physicians thought
whisky was a necessary therapeutic agent, while smaller but significant percentages
held the same opinion about wine and beer.32 Largely in response to this poll, the
AMA reversed course in 1922, resolving that restrictions on medicinal liquor were “a
serious interference with the practice of medicine.”33 Whiskey and brandy
reappeared in the 1925 (10th) edition of the U.S. Pharmacopoeia.34
The Volstead Act, enacted by Congress in 1919 to implement the Eighteenth
Amendment, recognized the use of alcoholic beverages in medicine. It allowed
physicians to prescribe, and pharmacists to dispense, liquor for medicinal purposes,
albeit pursuant to a stringent permit scheme.35 The Act permitted states and localities
27 Carson v. State, 69 Ala. 235, 241 (1881); see also State v. McBryer, 2 S.E. 755 (N.C. 1887); Carl
v. State, 8 So. 156 (Ala. 1890); State v. Durein, 78 P. 152, 156 (Kan. 1904); cf. Wright v. State, 101 Ill.
126 (1881) (no implied medical exception to dramshop licensing act); Motlow v. State, 145 S.W. 177
(Tenn. 1912) (upholding total manufacturing ban).
28

Id.

29

Bartlett C. Jones, A Prohibition Problem: Liquor as Medicine 1920-1933, 18 J. HIST. MED.
ALLIED SCI. 353, 353–54 (1963).
30

American Medical Association and Prohibition, 176 BOSTON MED. SURG. J. 884–85, 885 (1917).

31

Id.; Jacob M. Appel, “Physicians are not Bootleggers”: The Short, Peculiar Life of the Medicinal
Alcohol Movement, 82 BULL. HIST. MED. 355, 361–62 (2008).
32 The Referendum on the Use of Alcohol in the Practice of Medicine, 78 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 210,
210 (1922).
33

Jones, supra note 29, at 358.

34

PHARMACOPOEIA OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 352–54, 356 (10th ed. 1925).

35

National Prohibition Act of 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-66, §§ 6–8, 41 Stat. 305, 310–11 (1919).
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to regulate alcohol more strictly than the federal government, however, and many
did; indeed, about half of states declined to issue any medical permits at all.36
Moreover, in 1921, Congress passed the Willis-Campbell Act, which prohibited
physicians nationwide from prescribing beer and set stricter limits than the Volstead
Act on the quantity of spirits and wine they could prescribe.37
During the Prohibition Era, medical professionals occasionally fought such
restrictions in court, though with almost complete futility. In 1923, a Los Angeles
pharmacist convicted of filling a liquor prescription in violation of that city’s
ordinance alleged that the measure was invalid because, in combination with federal
restrictions, it effectively limited sales to minute amounts that were therapeutically
valueless. A California appeals court unequivocally rejected this argument.
If wine, whisky, brandy, and the like are useful for medicinal and other
nonbeverage purposes, still the evils which flow from their use as a
beverage so greatly menace the health, peace, morals, and safety of
society that the lawmaking branch of the government may with reason
regard those evils as overwhelmingly outweighing the good services
which such liquors may perform as medicines . . . . That the sale of such
liquors for medicinal purposes does greatly facilitate the evasion of the
whole scheme of prohibitory legislation is a matter of common
notoriety.38
During the same period, a group of more than one hundred prominent New York
physicians formed the Association for the Protection of Constitutional Rights
(APCR) to challenge the Willis-Campbell Act’s quantity limits on prescriptions. In
1922, the APCR’s president, Samuel W. Lambert (formerly the dean of Columbia’s
medical school) filed a federal lawsuit alleging that these provisions were
unconstitutional.39 Lambert advanced three main legal theories: (1) the Act exceeded
Congress’s power under the Eighteenth Amendment to regulate the beverage use of
alcohol, (2) it constituted federal regulation of medical practice, an area reserved
exclusively to the states, and (3) it violated physicians’ “fundamental” right to
practice medicine however they deemed necessary to heal the sick.40 In 1926, the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected these arguments in Lambert v. Yellowley.41
While Lambert litigated his dispute, John Patrick Davin, another respected New
York City physician, fought the Willis-Campbell Act outside of court. His main
grievance was the law’s prohibition on medical use of beer. Davin had testified
against passage of the Act in Congress, insisting that beer was a useful remedy
against many illnesses and generally condemning government regulation of medical
practice. Unsuccessful on this front, he co-founded a political party called the
Medical Rights League in 1922 and launched an unsuccessful campaign for
Congress under its aegis.42
36

ERNEST H. CHERRINGTON, ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE YEAR BOOK 15 (1921).

37

Willis-Campbell Act, Pub. L. No. 67-96, 42 Stat. 222 (1921).

38

In re Application of Hixson, 214 P. 677, 679 (Cal. App. 1923).

39

Appel, supra note 31, at 376–83.

40

Brief for Appellant, Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926) (No. 47).

41

Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
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Radical prohibitionists considered medical alcohol advocacy to be a shrewd
wedge attack on the very concept of prohibition.43 Some “wets” likely agreed. But
many physicians opposing Willis-Campbell were genuinely fighting for the rights of
physicians and (vicariously) patients. Indeed, some of the APCR’s founding
members were fervent prohibitionists with respect to alcoholic beverages and
insisted that the organization disassociate itself from the broader anti-prohibition
movement—a foreshadowing of the posture of many medical marijuana advocates a
half century later.44
In 1933, the 21st Amendment was ratified, repealing the 18th. Amendment.
National prohibition disappeared, and only a few states maintained the policy. By
1940, disputes regarding medical alcohol had largely vanished—both because liquor
was widely available for any use and because physicians, practicing in the context of
emerging “wonder drugs,” had largely stopped prescribing it. Whiskey and brandy
disappeared from the USP for good with the 1947 (13th) edition.
As a legal matter, the long struggle over the medical use of alcoholic beverages
provided mostly harmful precedents for the later medical marijuana movement. The
judicial decisions generally confirmed the power of the state and federal
governments to highly restrict or even wholly prohibit the medical use of an
intoxicating and addictive product due to its social and moral risks.45 Moreover, the
only notable public campaign in favor of medical use of alcoholic beverages—
Davin’s short-lived Medical Rights League—was a flop. Davin’s campaign
represented elite physicians, however; it was not a popular social movement. The
country had not yet seen what might happen when a broad coalition of highly
motivated patients demanded access to a culturally disfavored medicine.

THE RISE AND FALL OF MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE (2700 BC
TO 1972 AD)
Cultures around the world have used marijuana therapeutically for millennia.
They have taken it orally, smoked it, and applied it topically. In Central Asia,
cannabis’s native region, people apparently used the plant for medicinal purposes
(and other reasons) for many thousands of years before the dawn of recorded history.
The first written mention of the medical use of marijuana appears in Chinese sources
from about 2700 BCE. As cannabis cultivation propagated around the Old World,
culture after culture absorbed the plant into their armamentariums. Marijuana was
used in ancient Indian Ayurvedic medicine, in African shamanistic healing, and as a
peasant folk remedy in Europe. These traditional medical systems employed

43

Beverly Gage, Just What the Doctor Ordered, 36 SMITHSONIAN, April 2005, at 112–18.

44

Appel, supra note 31, at 377.

45

See, however, Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925), in which the Court overturned the
conviction of a physician under the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, a 1914 federal revenue statute that taxed
and regulated the distribution of opiates and cocaine. The Court held that the particular act of dispensing
by the doctor fell within a “professional practice” exception in the statute. The decision noted that
“[o]bviously, direct control of medical practice in the states is beyond the power of the Federal
government” and that application of the Harrison law to Dr. Linder’s conduct “would certainly encounter
grave constitutional difficulties.” Id. at 18, 22. Brandeis ignored Linder when he decided Lambert
(although Lambert cited it).
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cannabis to treat a wide variety of conditions, such as rheumatism, fever, malaria,
insomnia, digestive problems, and anxiety.46
Planters in the American colonies and the early republic—including George
Washington and Thomas Jefferson—grew large volumes of cannabis for commercial
use. The fiber from the plant’s stem (hemp) was used to manufacture rope, paper,
and fabric, and the seeds provided hempseed oil. Scholars disagree about how
frequently the psychoactive flowers and leaves were used for medical or recreational
purposes during the country’s early years, although the minimalists seem to have the
better of the argument.47 In the middle of the nineteenth century, however—just as
hemp fiber was losing much of its commercial value—cannabis entered orthodox
western medicine, thanks to the work of an Irish physician-scientist named William
B. O’Shaughnessy. While posted in Calcutta as an employee of the British East India
Company in the 1830s, O’Shaughnessy researched medical uses of the plant and
published his results.48 In the early 1840s, he brought this knowledge (and a supply
of marijuana) back with him to England. There, he oversaw the production of
Squire’s Extract, the first of many cannabis preparations sold as remedies in Britain
and the United States.49 In 1851, marijuana made its first appearance in the U.S.
Pharmaocopoeia, listed as “EXCTRACTUM CANNABIS. Extract of Hemp.”50
Medical marijuana use in the United States crested in the late nineteenth century.
In 1885, the Dispensatory of the United States (an unofficial companion to the U.S.
Pharmacopoeia) noted that extract of hemp was known “to cause sleep, to allay
spasm, to compose nervous disquietude, and to relieve pain,” and was also
prescribed for “neuralgia, gout, rheumatism, tetanus, hydrophobia, epidemic cholera,
convulsions, chorea, hysteria, mental depression, delirium tremens, insanity, and
uterine hemorrhage.”51 By 1900, medical journals had published more than one
hundred articles regarding the drug’s efficacy.52 Although marijuana was never a
mainstay of American medicine, more than one in a thousand prescriptions in the
early 1900s were for cannabis extracts or tinctures, many of which were
manufactured by leading pharmaceutical manufacturers such as Eli Lilly and
Squibb.53 Numerous other companies sold over-the-counter patent drugs containing
46 MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA—MEDICAL,
RECREATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 3–5, 13–14, 20–21 (2012); MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS: A HISTORY 22–
23, 70–72 (2003); ROBERT DEITCH, HEMP - AMERICAN HISTORY REVISITED: THE PLANT WITH A DIVIDED
HISTORY 9–10 (2003).
47 Compare LEE, supra note 46, at 16–19 (use was limited to seeds and fiber), with DEITCH, supra
note 46, at 25–27 (colonial Americans commonly smoked cannabis for medicinal and recreational
purposes).
48 W.B. O’Shaughnessy, Case of Tetanus, Cured by a Preparation of Hemp (the Cannabis indica),
8 TRANSACTIONS OF THE MED. & PHYSICAL SOC’Y OF BENGAL 462–69 (1843); W.B. O’Shaughnessy, On
the Preparations of the Indian Hemp, or Gunjah, 8 TRANSACTIONS OF THE MED. & PHYSICAL SOC’Y OF
BENGAL, 421–61 (1839).
49 LEE, supra note 46, at 24–25; BOOTH, supra note 46, at 109–14; JOHN GELUARDI, CANNABIZ:
THE EXPLOSIVE RISE OF THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA INDUSTRY 19–21 (2010).
50

PHARMACOPOIEA OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 50 (3rd ed. 1853).

51

H. C. WOOD, JOSEPH P. REMINGTON & SAMUEL P. SADTLER, THE DISPENSATORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 341 (15th ed. 1885).
52
53

LEE, supra note 46, at 25–26.

Taxation of Marihuana: Hearing on H.R. 6385 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 75th
Cong. 114 (1937) [hereinafter Taxation of Marihuana Hearing].
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cannabis, often without listing it as an ingredient. One French business even sold
cannabis-based “Indian Cigarettes” in the United States as a treatment for asthma.54
The medical use of marijuana plummeted during the first few decades of the
twentieth century; by 1933, prescriptions of cannabis preparations had plunged by
about 97 percent from their peak.55 In hearings preceding the passage of the federal
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 (discussed below), witnesses described medical use of
cannabis as “rare” and “disappearing.”56 Probably the most important factor in
marijuana’s vanishing role in American medicine was the development of superior
alternatives to it for many conditions. New synthetic drugs were equally or more
effective, highly standardized (thus providing more consistent results), and injectable
(thus quicker-acting).57
Lawmakers also played a role in pushing medical cannabis into oblivion,
however, due mainly to their loathing of the drug’s recreational use. This attitude
was rooted largely in racism; in the early 1900s, most Americans who used
marijuana as an intoxicant were either Mexican-Americans clustered in the
Southwest or African-Americans in the urban jazz scene.58 Congress took an initial
baby step into marijuana regulation in 1906 with passage of the Pure Food and Drugs
Act. That statute sensibly mandated that labels declare the amount of cannabis
present in any drug containing the substance (along with the amount of alcohol,
morphine, opium, cocaine, and heroin).59 The federal Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of
1914, enacted to reduce abuse of opiates and coca-derived drugs, did not mention
cannabis, due partly to pressure from drug companies.60 But shortly after its passage,
states began to include prohibitions on the sale of marijuana in their own antinarcotics statutes. Although these bans were initially concentrated in western states
(where legislators were motivated largely by anti-Mexican prejudice), 22 states
around the country had passed such laws by 1931.61
In 1934, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated a Uniform Narcotic Drug Act for voluntary adoption by the states. This
statute prohibited the sale, distribution, and possession of narcotics, subject to
narrow exceptions.62 The Uniform Act included the option of regulating cannabis
like other narcotics. Harry Anslinger, the first commissioner of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics in the Treasury Department, conducted an aggressive campaign to
persuade states to embrace the law and to include cannabis. His explicitly racist
crusade—bolstered by the Hearst newspaper chain—demonized marijuana as a
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promoter of violence, crime, sexual depravity, and insanity, particularly in minority
communities.63 By 1937, 35 states had enacted the Uniform Act with its optional
marijuana provisions, and every other state had passed alternative anti-cannabis
legislation.64 This early wave of anti-marijuana laws culminated with the 1937
passage of the federal Marihuana Tax Act.65 This statute, modeled on the Harrison
Act, was another product of Anslinger’s anti-drug zealotry. It sought to tax and
regulate marijuana out of existence.
None of the anti-marijuana statutes discussed above—the early state laws, the
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, and the Marihuana Tax Act—prohibited the medical
use of cannabis.66 Nonetheless, these laws effectively discouraged doctors from
prescribing the drug. Not only did they have a stigmatizing effect on cannabis, but
they also imposed administrative burdens and taxes on all of the actors along
marijuana’s chain of distribution. William C. Woodward, the AMA’s Legislative
Counsel, testified against the Marihuana Tax Act, decrying the taxes and additional
paperwork it imposed on physicians.67 (Woodward also warned that taxes on growers
might eliminate marijuana production—an unacceptable result, because “future
investigation may show that there are substantial medical uses for cannabis.”68)
Another witness, representing a pharmacists’ association, declared that should the
law pass, he would destroy all the cannabis drugs he had in stock “so I will not have
to register and will not have to pay that extra tax.”69 When the Marihuana Tax Act
took effect, many pharmacists presumably did exactly this.
In short, due to both pharmaceutical advances and legal developments, by the start
of World War II, American physicians almost never prescribed or recommended
marijuana to patients. In 1942, the U.S. Pharmacopoeia omitted cannabis after
almost a century of listing the drug.70 Even as marijuana became increasingly
popular as an intoxicant in the 1950s and 1960s (with the beatniks and hippies
leading the way), its use as medicine remained rare.
President Richard Nixon, first elected in 1968, identified the recreational use of
pot with crime and the leftist counterculture. He waged a fierce, multipronged “War
on Drugs.” One the first shots in that war occurred in 1970, with the passage of the
federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The prior year, the U.S. Supreme Court
had struck down the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act as unconstitutional in a case brought
by Timothy Leary, an ex-Harvard lecturer, countercultural hero, and psychedelic
drug enthusiast.71 Congress enacted the CSA in response to this decision, as well as
63 LEE, supra note 46, at 48–54; BOOTH, supra note 46, at 174–94; HUDAK, supra note 9, at 25–26,
35–40; GELUARDI, supra note 49, at 26–31; Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 58, at 1037–53.
64
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international treaty obligations. The statute—still in effect today—created a tiered
system in which drugs of abuse were put into one of five differently regulated
“schedules,” depending on various factors. The CSA placed cannabis into Schedule
I, the most stringently regulated category, reserved for drugs with a “high potential
for abuse,” “a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision,” and “no
currently accepted medical use.”72 Schedule I drugs were available only for research
purposes, and even scientific investigators had to jump through numerous
bureaucratic hoops to obtain them. Heroin and LSD were among other drugs in this
category. Cocaine was in Schedule II.
Congress’s classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug in 1970 provoked a
reaction that gave birth to the modern medical marijuana movement. The first phase
of this movement would take place primarily in courtrooms and federal
administrative agencies and would forge an alliance between medical marijuana
proponents and advocates of comprehensive legalization. Initially, this relationship
was (relatively) cordial.

REFORM WITHIN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1972-1986)
The Reemergence of Medical Marijuana
Although the U.S. government dismissed the medical use of marijuana in 1970,
others were not ready to do so. Just as the CSA went into effect, modern scientific
research emerged supporting cannabis’s therapeutic potential. Studies published in
1971 suggested that the drug was an appetite stimulant and anticonvulsant, and that it
might be effective in the treatment of glaucoma, the leading cause of blindness.73
The next year, the CSA-mandated National Commission on Marihuana and Drug
Abuse, known as the “Shafer Commission” (after its chairman, former Pennsylvania
governor Raymond Shafer), issued a report titled Marijuana: A Signal of
Misunderstanding. This report garnered headlines because of its proposal to
decriminalize the personal possession and use of pot. Less noticed was an addendum
recommending that the federal government support studies examining the efficacy of
marijuana in the treatment of various diseases, including glaucoma, migraine,
alcoholism, and cancer.74
Two months after the release of this report, NORML and two other organizations
commenced a formal challenge to marijuana’s Schedule I status. R. Keith Stroup, a
young lawyer, had founded NORML in 1970 with the mission of fighting for
decriminalization and eventual full legalization. In May 1972, it petitioned the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (the predecessor to the DEA) to either
remove marijuana from the ambit of the CSA altogether or to reschedule it into a less
regulated category. This petition, which challenged Congress’s conclusion that

72 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§§ 202(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (emphasis added).
73 Studies cited within INST. OF MED., COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE HEALTH-RELATED EFFECTS OF
CANNABIS AND ITS DERIVATIVES, MARIJUANA AND HEALTH 139–55 (1982) [hereinafter HEALTHRELATED EFFECTS OF CANNABIS STUDY].
74 U.S. COMM’N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG
ABUSE 176 (1972); Fred P. Graham, National Commission to Propose Legal Private Use of Marijuana,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1972, at 1.
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cannabis had “no currently accepted medical use,” marked the start of a tortuous
journey back and forth between the agency and the courts—an odyssey that did not
finally end until the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the DEA’s
denial of the petition more than twenty years later.75

The Trial of Robert Randall
In late 1973, Robert Randall, a 25-year-old aspiring political speechwriter living
in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C., accepted a joint from a friend. Randall
was suffering from a severe case of glaucoma, a disease that destroys vision by
increasing pressure within the eyeball. Despite his ophthalmologist’s best efforts,
Randall had already lost much of his sight. But that evening, when he looked out the
window after smoking, the haloes he normally saw around streetlights were absent.
Stoned and delighted, Randall immediately hypothesized a link between marijuana
use and lowered intraocular eye pressure. This theory turned into a conviction in the
following months, as Randall successfully medicated himself with weed.
Randall obtained marijuana on the black market for a couple of years, but with the
intensification of Nixon’s War on Drugs, the street became an unreliable source.
Randall thus decided to grow pot for himself on the deck of his new home on Capitol
Hill. This plan went awry in the summer of 1975, when D.C. police officers spotted
and seized Randall’s modest cannabis crop. He and his partner, Alice O’Leary, were
arrested and charged with possession.
Up to that point in his life, Randall had been disinclined to challenge the system.
But now, impelled by righteous anger, he decided to fight the criminal charge on the
theory that the drug laws should not apply to people who needed marijuana for
medical reasons.76 He turned to NORML for assistance in preparing his defense.
Keith Stroup—helpful but not encouraging—provided him with a folder of
information on medical marijuana that the organization had gathered in connection
with its rescheduling petition.77 Randall, who was eking out a living on a mere $68
per week as a part-time professor, then asked Stroup for financial assistance for his
legal defense. Stroup provided him with funds from an arm of NORML called
(tellingly) the Center for the Study of Non-Medical Drug Use.78
Randall’s bid for acquittal depended on his successful deployment of the
“necessity defense,” an oft-discussed, rarely invoked, and almost never applied
doctrine in criminal law. Stated broadly, it provides that a crime may be excused if
the defendant committed the criminal act in an emergency situation to prevent a
greater harm from occurring. Generations of law students have learned this doctrine
through the celebrated English case Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, in which
castaways from a yacht, facing starvation in a lifeboat, killed and ate the cabin boy.79
As some students forget, this case held that necessity was not a defense to murder. It
rarely worked in other contexts, either.
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Defendants typically had trouble satisfying all of the necessity defense’s multiple
requirements. Particularly problematic for Randall were those cases in which courts
denied application of the defense in the context of medical alcohol. As we saw
earlier, for example, an 1849 decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
rejected the use of the necessity defense by an unlicensed storekeeper indicted for
providing a desperate patient with alcohol pursuant to a doctor’s prescription.80 The
court apparently concluded—in view of alcohol’s negative effect on society—that
the storekeeper failed to show that the harm avoided by his action was more serious
than the harm caused.
To successfully plead the necessity defense, a defendant must also demonstrate he
had no practically available, less harmful alternative course of action. In 1899, this
requirement tripped up a Georgia woman charged with violating a statute prohibiting
the possession of alcohol at church. Although her physician had recommended that
she have whiskey with her at all times because of a heart condition, the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled that the necessity defense did not apply because she had less
offensive alternatives—namely, to stay at home or to carry some other kind of
medicine.81
Randall’s trial for marijuana possession took place in July 1976 before D.C.
Superior Court Judge James Washington, formerly the dean of Howard University
Law School. Randall’s ophthalmologist testified in his defense, and his lawyer
introduced a deposition taken from the researcher who first studied marijuana’s
effect of lowering eye pressure. In December, Judge Washington issued a daring
decision acquitting Randall on the basis of “medical necessity.”82 He found that
Randall had no acceptable alternative to smoking marijuana. He explained that
“treatment with other drugs has become ineffective, and surgery offers only a slim
possibility of favorable results coupled with a significant risk of immediate
blindness.”83 The judge also confidently ruled that the harm (blindness) avoided by
Randall’s personal growth and use of marijuana outweighed the “slight, speculative,
and undemonstrable harm” caused by it.84
Intriguingly, Washington put a thumb on Randall’s side of the scale by citing Roe
v. Wade, then three years old. He invoked Roe’s emphasis on “the fundamental
nature of the right of an individual to preserve and control her body.” Although he
did not go so far as to hold that Roe gave Randall a constitutional right to use
marijuana, the judge explained that the case was relevant to the application of the
necessity defense because of its “revelation of how far-reaching is the right of an
individual to preserve his health and bodily integrity.”85
After this decision, Randall became, in his own words, “America’s only legal pot
smoker.”86 Even before his acquittal, Randall had commenced a struggle to persuade
the relevant federal agencies to officially authorize his marijuana use and provide
him with a stable and legal supply of the drug. These agencies included the Food and
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Drug Administration (FDA), which cleared investigational uses of unapproved
drugs; the DEA, which controlled access to schedule I drugs used for research; and
the National Institute for Drug Abuse (NIDA), which contracted with the University
of Mississippi to grow research-grade marijuana. With NORML’s assistance,
Randall had broken the bureaucratic logjam with a canny media campaign. In
November 1976, the month prior to Randall’s acquittal, ophthalmologist John
Merritt of Howard University Hospital had provided him with 45 NIDA-supplied
marijuana cigarettes pursuant to an FDA-approved Investigational New Drug (IND)
application.87
Although the government demanded Randall’s silence as a price for this
arrangement, he continued to appear in the press. Consequently, after Dr. Merritt
moved away from Washington in early 1978 (bequeathing his last 100 joints to
Randall), the federal bureaucrats were uncooperative about transitioning the cannabis
“study” to another physician. Randall filed a lawsuit that May, alleging that the
government was unconstitutionally coercing him to sacrifice his right to speech as a
condition for preserving his “right to sight.”88 The United States quickly settled the
litigation and agreed to resume supplying marijuana to Randall under the auspices of
a new IND with a different physician-investigator. In complying with this settlement
obligation, the FDA established a new “Compassionate IND” process that could also
be used by other patients.89

Robert Randall’s Reform Efforts
In mid-1978, with Randall’s own situation resolved, he and Alice O’Leary turned
to assisting other medical marijuana users. In 1980, they formed the Alliance for
Cannabis Therapeutics (ACT), a nonprofit corporation whose mission was “to
promote the public interest in and work to ensure the adequacy of cannabis supplies
for legitimate medical, therapeutic, scientific, and research purposes.”90
One of ACT’s primary activities was helping other patients negotiate the new
Compassionate IND procedure. In 1980, with ACT’s assistance, Anne Guttentag
(who smoked cannabis to combat nausea caused by chemotherapy for ovarian
cancer) became the second American to obtain marijuana from the government
pursuant to an approved Compassionate IND.91 Guttentag passed away in 1981, but
the following year Randall and O’Leary ushered another patient into the program—
Irvin Rosenfeld, who suffered from a rare bone disease.92 The small community of
legal pot smokers grew slowly throughout the decade, as the FDA issued
Compassionate INDs for other individuals with various conditions, including AIDS.
After the FDA approved seven Compassionate INDs in a single day in December
1990, about fifteen people were in the program.93 In February 1991, Randall
launched the Marijuana/AIDS Research Service (MARS). By bundling and partly
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completing the necessary forms, this service dramatically eased the administrative
burden on physicians and patients seeking to enter the Compassionate IND
program.94
A second critical aspect of Randall and O’Leary’s medical marijuana work was
their fight to get the drug rescheduled under the Controlled Substances Act. In the
early 1980s, Randall co-drafted and lobbied for federal legislation that would
reclassify marijuana as Schedule II and create a reliable supply system for patients
with “life-threatening and sense-threatening” diseases.95 Reflecting the issue’s
bipartisan appeal, four Republicans introduced this bill—including a young archconservative representative from Georgia (and future Speaker of the House) named
Newt Gingrich. The bill eventually acquired more than 70 cosponsors from both
parties, ranging from ultra-liberal Barney Frank of Massachusetts to religious rightwinger William Dannemeyer of California.96
The odd politics of pot ultimately sank this legislation, however. In early 1983,
Gingrich bent to the Reagan Administration’s increasingly ardent anti-drug rhetoric
and withdrew his sponsorship of the bill. He explained to Randall, “The factual case
[for medical marijuana] is sustainable, but the cultural case is not.”97 California’s
Henry Waxman—a Democrat, consumer protection advocate, and chairman of the
relevant House subcommittee—then effectively killed the bill by refusing to
schedule hearings, despite Randall’s entreaties. The bill never came to a vote, despite
being reintroduced in the two subsequent Congresses.98
Meanwhile, NORML’s 1972 rescheduling petition continued its odyssey through
the federal bureaucracy. Under the CSA, the DEA Administrator is required, before
commencing rulemaking procedures to reschedule or de-schedule a controlled
substance, to obtain a scientific and medical evaluation and recommendation from
the Secretary of HHS. In practice, the FDA (a subagency of HHS) carries out this
evaluation in consultation with NIDA (also part of HHS). The HHS
recommendations are binding on the DEA with respect to scientific and medical
matters.99
In accordance with this procedure, the FDA recommended in 1983 that the DEA
retain marijuana’s Schedule I classification, concluding that it had no “currently
accepted medical use.” The scientific record supporting efficacy was indeed thin, in
large part because scientists interested in studying the medical effects of cannabis
faced numerous regulatory hurdles. First of all, the CSA imposed an extra layer of
bureaucratic requirements on any research using Schedule I substances. Secondly,
the FDA generally would not approve an IND for a clinical investigation of
marijuana unless the sponsor was able to prove that it could administer an essentially
identical dose to every subject—a steep challenge when dealing with a naturally
variable botanical product. Third, researchers could not readily obtain a supply of
weed, because the only legal source was the NIDA-controlled cannabis farm at the
University of Mississippi. Finally, it was often impossible to attract funding for
94

Id. at 358–61.

95

H.R. 4498, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 16, 1981).

96

H.R. 4498, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 3, 1982) (new cosponsors).

97

RANDALL & O’LEARY, MARIJUANA RX, supra note 76, at 275.

98

Id. at 263–67, 271–77; LEE, supra note 46, at 166–67.

99

21 U.S.C. § 811(b); 66 Fed. Reg. 20,038 (Apr. 18, 2001).

296

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 74

marijuana research; the naturally occurring plant would be ineligible for patent
protection, thus making it impossible for funders to recoup their investment even in
the event of ultimate FDA approval.100
Nonetheless, by the early 1980s, a few tenacious scientists had managed to
conduct studies on marijuana’s potential therapeutic effects. Some of the studies
were promising, but not all, and the body of research as a whole was merely
preliminary with respect to both benefits and risks. A 1982 Institute of Medicine
(IOM) report examined the completed research and concluded that marijuana “might
be useful” in the treatment of some conditions, but that “much more work [was]
needed.” 101 The report further opined that in light of marijuana’s psychotropic and
cardiovascular side-effects, “the greatest therapeutic potential probably lies in . . .
synthetic analogues of marijuana derivatives.”102
Three years later, the DEA Administrator finally instructed Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) Francis L. Young to conduct hearings regarding NORML’s 1972
rescheduling petition. The notice of the hearing invited “all interested persons” to
participate.103 Randall and O’Leary’s ACT—despite some reluctance about working
alongside NORML—now joined the effort and, indeed, prepared the bulk of the
case.104 In 1987 and 1988, Young collected voluminous medical evidence in the form
of affidavits and exhibits from ACT, NORML, and the DEA, and also conducted
three oral hearings around the country. The issue for decision, as stipulated by the
parties, was whether the marijuana plant should be transferred to Schedule II. The
determination of this issue would hinge on two CSA criteria: (1) whether “the
marijuana plant has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States” and (2) whether “there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the marijuana
plant under medical supervision.”105
In September 1988, ALJ Young issued a decision that garnered national headlines
and galvanized marijuana advocates and anti-drug warriors alike. He found it “clear
beyond any question” that “many” medical professionals, researchers, and patients
accepted the use of pot to treat nausea and vomiting accompanying chemotherapy.
He also determined that a “significant minority” of physicians embraced marijuana
for treatment of spasticity resulting from multiple sclerosis (MS) and other causes.
(Interestingly, Young declined to make a similar finding with respect to glaucoma.)
The ALJ also opined that “[m]arijuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest
therapeutically active substances known to man” and that many physicians
recognized its safety. Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that the terms of
the CSA “permit and require the transfer of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule
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II.”106 Although Young’s order constituted only a recommendation, ACT and
NORML were on the verge of a major triumph.
A third area of activity for ACT was advocating for recognition of the medical
necessity defense in court. In 1988, Randall helped prepare the successful necessity
defense of Elvy Musikka, a glaucoma patient, already blind in one eye, whom
Florida prosecuted for growing four marijuana plants in her home.107 Randall also
worked closely with Kenneth and Barbara Jenks, a married Florida couple who
contracted AIDS following Kenneth’s infection by a contaminated blood transfusion.
Florida prosecuted them for growing two marijuana plants for medical use behind
their trailer, and they were convicted. In 1991, however, an appeals court, citing both
the Randall and Musikka decisions, overturned the Jenks’ conviction on the basis of
the medical necessity defense.108 Musikka and the Jenks joined Randall in the
Compassionate IND program and received a legal supply of marijuana from the
federal government.109
Randall and O’Leary also did political advocacy work at the state level. With their
support, between 1978 and 1982, about thirty states, of all ideological stripes,
enacted legislation either recognizing marijuana’s therapeutic value or, more
commonly, recognizing its potential value and stating the need for further research.
This number would reach 34 by the end of the 1980s. About seventeen states
established therapeutic research programs and obtained FDA-approved INDs, and
between six and ten of these actually administered NIDA-provided marijuana to ill
patients through these programs.110

Randall’s Accomplishments Unravel
Randall and O’Leary’s heady (pun intended) triumphs were only temporary,
however. By the mid-1990s, their multipronged medical marijuana strategy was in
tatters.
Even before the end of the 1980s, states began revoking their medical marijuana
statutes or letting them expire. Even where such laws survived, state cannabis
research programs withered and disappeared, both because potential research
subjects could obtain the drug more readily on the street than in a study and because
the federal government stopped providing pot to these programs. By 1990, the only
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individuals in the country still legally smoking marijuana were the few fortunate
patients within FDA’s Compassionate IND program.111
At the federal level, a devastating blow came on the last workday of 1989, when
the DEA Administrator rejected ALJ Young’s recommendation and decided to
maintain marijuana’s Schedule I status.112 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit briefly revived marijuana proponents’ hopes in 1991, when it questioned the
administrator’s precise reasoning and remanded the matter to the agency. But in
1992, the Administrator issued a new order that almost contemptuously rejected
ACT’s and NORML’s evidence and kept marijuana in Schedule I.113 In 1994, the
D.C. Circuit upheld this order and finally laid the 22-year-old rescheduling petition
to rest.114
For medical marijuana advocates, the most damaging aspect of the D.C. Circuit’s
decision was its approval of the DEA’s new five-part test for determining whether a
drug has “currently accepted medical use.”115 One criterion was that “there must be
adequate and well-controlled studies proving efficacy.”116 The DEA explained that
the evidence required to satisfy this factor was generally identical to that needed to
obtain FDA approval—that is, two positive adequate and well-controlled phase III
clinical trials.117 By this standard, the scientific record was nowhere close to
supporting the rescheduling of marijuana. And because of the administrative burdens
on cannabis research, and the lack of financial incentives to conduct it, the needed
studies might never be performed.
Another severe setback occurred in 1991, when the federal government
announced that it would phase out the Compassionate IND program, which had been
flooded with requests from AIDS patients since Randall established MARS. James
Mason, the chief of the Public Health Service (PHS), explained to a journalist that
the program sent a “bad signal” that undercut the Bush Administration’s battle
against drug abuse.118
Mason urged patients to instead try THC in capsule form. THC is marijuana’s
principal psychoactive cannabinoid. In 1985, the FDA approved a synthetic version
of it under the brand name Marinol® for treatment of nausea and vomiting
associated with cancer chemotherapy. Many medical marijuana activists had
welcomed the approval at the time, but now they seethed as the federal government
used Marinol’s availability to justify cutting off access to marijuana cigarettes. Many
patients did not find synthetic THC capsules to be as effective as smoked marijuana,
which contained more than sixty additional cannabinoids. Moreover, smoked pot
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took effect more quickly, its dose could be calibrated more precisely, and it was the
only choice for people suffering from severe vomiting.119
In 1992, despite ACT’s resistance, the PHS officially closed the Compassionate
IND program to new patients. Randall could take limited solace from the fact that he
and other existing participants were grandfathered in and would continue receiving
their joints, but nobody else in America would have a legal source for marijuana.
Over the next quarter of a century, the group of fourteen individuals receiving
Mississippi weed from NIDA dwindled as Randall and others passed away. Today,
only two remain.120
The emerging promise of the medical necessity defense also evaporated during
this period. Commonwealth v. Hutchins, a 1991 decision by Massachusetts’ highest
court, was particularly influential. Joseph Hutchins, a Navy veteran, smoked
marijuana to relieve the debilitating and life-threatening symptoms of scleroderma, a
chronic autoimmune disease acquired during his term of service. The court refused to
let him plead medical necessity, explaining that “the alleviation of the defendant’s
medical symptoms . . . would not clearly and significantly outweigh the potential
harm to the public were we to declare that [his] cultivation of marihuana and its use
for his medicinal purposes may not be punishable.”121 Subsequently, most courts
around the country refused to allow defendants charged with marijuana crimes to
plead the necessity defense provided by the common law or by general criminal
codes.122 It became increasingly clear that such a defense would be available to
cannabis sellers and users only if their states established it explicitly by legislation.
Clinton’s 1992 election initially gave Randall and O’Leary hope that they would
be able to restore, and perhaps greatly expand, access to medical marijuana through
existing federal mechanisms.123 They prepared a booklet of recommendations for
Clinton in which they urged the new president to restore the Compassionate IND
program and reschedule marijuana into Schedule II.124 Clinton, however, quickly
revealed himself to be no less opposed to medical marijuana than his predecessor.
By the mid-1990s, Robert Randall’s stint as the face of America’s medical
marijuana movement was ending, as Dennis Peron assumed the role. Randall’s
buttoned-down, work-within-the-system approach was eclipsed by Peron’s more
provocative and disruptive tactics. Randall’s dedication to federal reform gave way
to Peron’s almost exclusive focus on state-level activism. Randall’s strict
interpretation of what constituted valid medical use of marijuana (treatment of
serious diseases) was replaced, among some activists, by Peron’s view, which
blurred the line between medical and recreational use by deeming cannabis a
legitimate treatment for a very wide range of conditions. Under the influence of
people with AIDS, medical marijuana advocacy now became a genuine social
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movement characterized by uninhibited, aggressive, street-level direct action. And
the center of activity moved from Washington, D.C. to California.
Meanwhile, the relationship between ACT and the broader marijuana legalization
movement had frayed irreparably. Randall had concluded that NORML and other
drug reform organizations were “exploiting” patients to advance their own broader
legalization agendas. NORML, for its part, thought Randall was “putting a stiff arm
on NORML at the height of [cultural] anti-druggism, to advocate for medical-only
reforms.”125 A breaking point occurred in November 1994, when Randall refused to
participate in “National Medical Marijuana Day,” a multi-site protest planned by
NORML and its allies. Randall demurred not only because he thought the event was
poorly planned and futile, but also because he did not want sick people to be used as
props.126
Going forward, NORML would have to work with the medical marijuana
movement’s new standard-bearer, Dennis Peron. He would be no less complicated an
ally.

DENNIS PERON AND PROPOSITION 215 (1996)
California’s Proposition 215 was not the first state-level medical marijuana
measure. As noted above, by the mid-1990s, about 35 states had enacted a variety of
pro-medical pot statutes, often by overwhelming majorities. But these state laws had
almost no practical impact. They ranged from utterly useless legislative
“recognitions” of marijuana’s medical value to actual research programs that failed
to survive the 1980s. Proposition 215 was a different sort of law—one that would
immunize patients and their caregivers from state criminal prosecution for marijuana
possession or cultivation.

Peron’s Background
Dennis Peron, a self-proclaimed “hippie faggot,” got hooked on marijuana and
came out of the closet while serving in Vietnam as an Air Force volunteer. After his
1969 discharge, the native New Yorker settled in San Francisco, where he founded
the “Big Top,” a commune-cum-marijuana supermarket, in the Castro neighborhood.
During the 1970s, he advocated for marijuana legalization and participated in gay
rights activism. He was a close friend and leading supporter of Harvey Milk, a San
Francisco Board of Supervisors member and California’s first openly gay elected
official. In 1978, a deranged ex-supervisor assassinated Milk and Mayor George
Moscone inside City Hall. Peron learned of this tragedy from the San Francisco
County Jail, where he was serving a six-month sentence following a drug bust in
which a policeman shot him in the leg.
In the late 1980s, Peron’s devotion to marijuana legalization and gay rights
merged with the rise of the AIDS epidemic. He learned that people with AIDS
smoked marijuana to combat the anorexia, nausea, wasting syndrome, and pain that
accompanied the disease and its pharmaceutical treatments. His first concrete action
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in support of medical marijuana was his participation in a special-ops-like mission
that smuggled pot into a hospital AIDS ward for a dying man named Richard, then
aggressively barricaded the hospital room while Richard smoked. This operation,
Peron remembers, “started a lot of us thinking about marijuana in a different setting,
far from the protest drug that you get from a hippy in a schoolyard.”127
When Peron’s longtime lover, Jonathan West, fell ill, he too used cannabis for
relief. In January 1990, when West was in the very late stages of AIDS, police raided
Peron’s house and found four ounces of marijuana. Donning rubber gloves, they
forced Peron’s frail partner onto the floor, made cruel jokes (“AIDS means ‘Asshole
in Deep Shit’”), and arrested Peron for drug possession with intent to sell. Peron
escaped another jail term only because West—weak, ashen, and 85 pounds—
dragged himself to the trial and testified that the pot was his, not Peron’s. The judge
dismissed the charges. West’s death the next week led Peron, a longtime advocate
for full marijuana legalization, to start focusing his activism on medical cannabis.128
In 1991, Peron co-authored a San Francisco initiative endorsing the prescription
use of medical marijuana and led a successful grass-roots campaign to gather enough
signatures to get the measure on the ballot. The initiative, known as Proposition P,
passed with 80 percent of the vote in November 1991.Though legally toothless,
Proposition P attracted national media attention. The city’s Board of Supervisors
issued a resolution urging the mayor, police commissioner, and district attorney to
assign “lowest priority” status to the arrest and prosecution of individuals possessing
or cultivating medical marijuana for personal use.129 With Peron’s support, other
municipalities up and down the state also issued pro-medical-marijuana statements.
In 1993, Peron lobbied for California Senate Joint Resolution 8 (SJR8). This
measure, co-drafted by Robert Randall, urged President Clinton and Congress to
“enact appropriate legislation to permit cannabis/marijuana to be prescribed by
licensed physicians and to ensure a safe and affordable supply of cannabis/marijuana
for medical use.”130 SJR8 passed overwhelmingly, although most Republican
senators voted no. The politicians in Washington took no action. And although the
California legislature passed medical marijuana legalization bills the subsequent two
years, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed both.
During this period, Peron worked closely with an old friend, Mary Jane Rathbun.
“Brownie Mary,” an ex-IHOP waitress, had begun selling her cannabis-laced
comestibles in the 1970s on the streets of the Castro and out of Peron’s “Big Top.” In
the 1980s, she saw AIDS ravage her many gay customers and friends, and she began
distributing free joints and brownies to them for medical use. Rathbun received
national media coverage for her multiple arrests on drug charges and her
cantankerous yet compassionate advocacy for medical marijuana. She worked hand-
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in-hand with Peron in promoting Proposition P, SJR8, and, eventually, Proposition
215. When the San Francisco Board of Supervisors declared August 25, 1992
“Brownie Mary Day,” more than 5,000 people rallied in her honor on the steps of
City Hall.131
In the early 1990s, Peron joined Rathbun’s operation delivering marijuana edibles
and smokable “green bud” to people with AIDS in San Francisco. In 1993, to reach
more patients, Peron (with Rathbun’s assistance) opened the San Francisco Cannabis
Buyers Club (CBC). He modeled the enterprise on the AIDS Drugs Buyers’ Club, a
San Francisco entity that dispensed unapproved remedies but was not bold enough to
traffic in marijuana.132 The CBC’s audacious defiance of state and federal narcotics
laws went too far for some of Peron’s allies, and a fissure opened up in the medical
marijuana community. ACT, for example, refused to endorse the CBC and similar
clubs, in part because Randall and O’Leary were “unwilling to openly encourage
illegality” and in part because the clubs were “too loosely structured, allowing many
with questionable ‘ailments’ to obtain marijuana.” Randall thought Peron was
cynically exploiting sick people to disguise his true goal of running “a retail pot
shop,” and that this deceitful conduct “could potentially harm the medical marijuana
movement.”133
Within a couple of years after its founding, the CBC had between 8,000 and
10,000 members. It rapidly outgrew its first two locations and settled into an edifice
on Market Street affectionately known as the “Brownie Mary Building.” At least in
theory, the club required every customer to present both a photo ID and a doctor’s
note stating that he or she had a medical condition (not necessarily a grave one) that
marijuana might alleviate. In addition to housing the nation’s first public marijuana
dispensary, the Brownie Mary Building was a social center for people with AIDS
and other illnesses. It was also the de facto headquarters for California medical
marijuana advocacy. In Peron’s office on the second floor, he and other promarijuana and patients’ rights advocates conceived of a plan to circumvent Governor
Wilson; they would present the issue of medical cannabis directly to the voters in a
veto-proof ballot initiative.134

Selling Proposition 215
Thus was born Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996. With a large
group of collaborators and attorneys, Peron drafted the measure through a
painstaking, eight-month process. The authors strove to make the initiative appealing
to voters, protective of patients, and immune as possible from legal challenges based
on federal preemption. The final product was in some ways a modest proposal. It
required a physician’s recommendation, explicitly declined to condone “the
diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes,” and elided the complicated
question of exactly who could legally cultivate and distribute medical marijuana. But
at Peron’s insistence, Proposition 215 also included one daringly broad provision: it
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legalized the use of cannabis not only for eight specified ailments, but also for “any
other illness for which marijuana provides relief.”135
Peron formed “Californians for Compassionate Use” (CCU) to collect the 433,000
valid signatures necessary to get the initiative onto the November 1996 ballot. In an
attempt to appeal to citizens beyond the progressive Bay Area, Peron cut his
shoulder-length hair and switched his attire from tie-dyed tee shirts and beads to
Oxford dress shirts and ties.136 The signature drive nevertheless stalled, and seemed
doomed, until billionaire George Soros contributed $350,000 to the effort.137 Rather
than direct the money to CCU, however, Soros hired Bill Zimmerman, a public
relations strategist, who created a separate organization called Californians for
Medical Rights (CMR). Other corporate leaders made large donations to CMR,
including Peter B. Lewis of Progressive Insurance, John G. Sperling of the
University of Phoenix, and Men’s Warehouse CEO George Zimmer (“You’ll like the
way you look. I guarantee it.”). The signature-gathering company retained by
Zimmerman collected far more signatures than necessary. State officials certified the
initiative in June 1996, and Proposition 215 was on the ballot.
Following certification, Zimmerman ran a slick, polished pro-Prop. 215 campaign.
He relied largely on television advertisements featuring medical professionals and
older women reminiscent of Brownie Mary. Zimmerman’s Madison-Avenue
approach represented a dramatic departure from Peron’s grass-roots ideal, and the
two men often clashed behind the scenes. Peron bristled at his counterpart’s
philosophy of total message control, his reliance on focus groups, and his strategy of
framing medical marijuana as a white, middle-class movement by excluding
countercultural figures and people of color from campaign materials.138
Peron and Zimmerman also tussled over how to formulate the “Argument in Favor
of Proposition 215” that would be included in the official “Ballot Pamphlet” mailed
to all voters. They submitted competing versions to the Republican secretary of state,
who unsurprisingly selected the PR man’s more conservative language. Peron was
particularly upset about a passage explaining that police officers would still be free
to arrest people for marijuana possession and that the measure merely gave such
arrestees an affirmative defense to use in court.139
The “Argument in Favor” reflected the fact that scientific evidence for the medical
effectiveness of smoked cannabis remained preliminary, at best. Although a growing
body of research suggested that, in isolation, the cannabinoids THC and CBD
(cannabidiol) might be useful in treating a range of conditions, the number of human
efficacy studies on smoked whole marijuana remained tiny.140 Moreover, none of the
completed studies came anywhere near the size, rigor, and design of the phase III
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trials that FDA ordinarily requires for drug approval. The California Medical
Association voted to oppose Proposition 215 because (its president explained)
“[g]ood [medical] care depends on good science, and we’re no closer today than we
were 20 years ago in understanding the safety and effectiveness of marijuana as a
medicine.”141
Nevertheless, many physicians and other medical professionals believed
marijuana should be available to their patients. In a 1991 survey, more than 44
percent of American oncologists reported recommending smoked marijuana to at
least one chemotherapy patient, and nearly half said they would if the drug were
legal.142 The official “Argument in Favor” of Proposition 215 relied largely on the
testimonials and endorsements of medical professionals who had “witnessed
firsthand the medical benefits of marijuana” and on the argument that “[d]octors and
patients should decide what medicines are best.”143 There was a stark difference
between the FDA standard for drug approval, on the one hand, and the standard by
which the people of California were being asked to “approve” marijuana, on the
other.144
As the campaign in favor of Proposition 215 proceeded, the rhetoric used by
Peron’s forces diverged strikingly from that used by Zimmerman’s team. This
difference is reflected in the names of their respective organizations: Californians for
Compassionate Use versus Californians for Medical Rights. Peron and his closest
allies, consciously or not, generally avoided the language of “rights” and “freedom”
and instead used tropes of “compassion” and “common sense.” For example, in a
San Francisco Examiner op-ed, Peron called Proposition 215 a “mission of mercy”
that would “herald a turn toward a more loving and compassionate society.”145 A
CCU pamphlet explained that the organization’s “sole purpose is to relieve
suffering.” These materials portrayed medical marijuana as a gift that a kind
civilization should bestow on its sickest members.146
By contrast, the CMR’s principal stated mission was to “protect the rights of
patients and doctors.”147 In one brochure, a nurse declared: “No government should
have the right to deprive a sick person of a medicine—for any reason.” In another, a
state legislator proclaimed: “It’s your life, it’s your freedom.”148 Conservative
libertarians who supported Proposition 215 were similarly comfortable with the
language of liberty and limited government. For example, Richard Brookhiser, a
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political journalist who had smoked marijuana as a cancer patient, wrote: “I support
the Christian Coalition and . . . the Moral Majority. But . . . [m]ost important, I
believe in getting government off the people’s backs.”149 David Boaz of the
libertarian Cato Institute praised Proposition 215’s “less government, more freedom”
message.
It is unclear why Peron generally eschewed such rhetoric. Perhaps he simply
calculated that appealing to the electorate’s hearts would be more effective than
appealing to their political principles.
Despite their differences, the CCU and CMR agreed that to win the election, they
must clearly distinguish Proposition 215 from the cause of comprehensive
legalization. Although every poll showed Californians overwhelmingly in favor of
medical marijuana, fewer than one quarter of the population supported legalizing
recreational use.150 In recognition of this fact, the law enforcement officials leading
the opposition to the initiative characterized it as a “cruel hoax” that “exploit[ed]
public compassion for the sick in order to legalize and legitimize the widespread use
of marijuana in California.”151 To resist any linkage between Proposition 215 and
recreational use in the eyes of the public, the CMR-drafted official argument in favor
of the initiative emphasized, “MARIJUANA WILL STILL BE ILLEGAL FOR
NON-MEDICAL USE.” Peron had the same aim when he frantically urged his allies
to refrain from recreational toking in front of the cameras on Election Day.152
This tactical imperative created an awkward situation for organizations like
NORML that supported both Proposition 215 and comprehensive legalization.
Though they were authentically committed to providing succor to sick individuals,153
they were also worried, as NORML’s Keith Stroup observed, that “the emerging
medical use debate might make it more difficult for us to focus public attention on
the issue we preferred they consider; i.e., whether to decriminalize or legalize
marijuana for everyone, recreational users as well as medical users.”154 Nonetheless,
during the Proposition 215 campaign, the supporters of full legalization were
disciplined and devoted warriors for medical-only cannabis. The week before the
election, Kevin Zeese of Common Sense for Drug Policy warned his fellow drug
policy reformers that they should respond with “extreme restraint” to the likely
victory, so as not to jeopardize further progress on medical marijuana. He cautioned
them that even if they saw Proposition 215 as a step toward comprehensive
legalization, “it is a mistake to say so publicly.”155
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This posture explains the legalizers’ exasperation at Peron’s antics after
Proposition 215 prevailed in November 1996. For months, they had stowed away
their ideal of full legalization to help the medical marijuana cause. Now, Peron—
with his “all marijuana use is medical” assertion—was insinuating that he shared
their ultimate goal of full legalization while cloaking this objective in the language of
medical policy. As Allen St. Pierre of NORML later recalled:
Dennis and his minions became obsessed with two propagandistic
notions. Only refer to marijuana as “medicine” [and] Declare ALL
cannabis use medicinal. The above two strategies were found to be so
vexing at places like NORML, that clear divisions opened up[:]
intellectually honest vs. dishonest . . . transparent vs. non-transparent
. . . .156

Implementing Proposition 215
Although Proposition 215 “encouraged” state officials to “implement a plan to
provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana” to patients, it left the
details to local lawmakers. The result was a hodgepodge of policies. Some
counties—with Attorney General Lungren’s backing—effectively proceeded as
though the new law did not exist. In these jurisdictions, law enforcement continued
to bust medical cannabis users, who highly regretted Zimmerman’s concession that
the initiative provided only an affirmative defense at trial, rather than a complete
shield from arrest. Meanwhile, the authorities in other areas—particularly liberal
bastions like the San Francisco Bay Area—left medical marijuana users alone and
permitted dispensaries to emerge and flourish.157
The existence of these dispensaries depended on the legal fiction that they were
their customers’ “primary caregivers” and thus allowed to obtain and distribute
marijuana pursuant to Proposition 215. Some of these entities, epitomized by Scott
Imler’s Los Angeles Cannabis Resource Center (LACRC) in West Hollywood,
cooperated with local law enforcement, rigorously verified prescriptions, banned onsite smoking, and generally conducted themselves like medical clinics. Such clubs
distributed pot only to patients suffering from an enumerated list of serious illnesses,
so as to strictly distinguish medical use from recreational use.
Peron’s newly-named “Cannabis Cultivators’ Club (CCC),” which reopened on
Market Street in January 1997, was extremely different. In a state lawsuit, Lungren
accused the CCC of “an indiscriminate and uncontrolled pattern of sale” to people
without doctors’ recommendations, including undercover officers.158 Peron
adamantly denied this charge, at least with respect to his post-Proposition 215
operations. But he could not deny—indeed, he took pride in—the fact that the CCC
was a thriving social hub with abundant on-site toking. He also openly
acknowledged implementing his “all marijuana use is medical” philosophy by selling
to everyone with a physician’s recommendation (including older minors), regardless
of the severity of their illness. In short, Peron conducted his operation in a way that
wholly vindicated NORML’s concerns about his deviousness.
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Imler, a gay Methodist minister, had been closely allied with Peron on the
Proposition 215 effort until Imler broke away to work with CMR. After the
initiative’s passage, the two men became the symbols of bitterly competing camps
that still characterize the medical marijuana industry. The taxpaying, rule-following
medical entrepreneurs on one side fought to distance themselves from the
antigovernment, anticorporatist, countercultural ethos embraced by the other. Imler
accused Peron of running a “clown show.” Peron called his rival “Benedict” Imler.
One observer described the Imler-Peron split as “legendary” within the medical
marijuana community. After a California appeals court upheld a state injunction
shutting down the CCC’s operations, Imler ungenerously observed that Peron had
served himself up to Lungren “on a silver platter.” Peron’s club—under legal attack
from both state and federal authorities—closed permanently on May 25, 1998.159
After Peron lost a whimsical challenge to Lungren for the Republican
gubernatorial nomination in 1998, his reign as the face of the medical marijuana
movement came to an end. Lungren also departed the scene around this time after
losing the general election in a landslide to Democrat Gray Davis. The next attorney
general, Bill Lockyer, basically continued Lungren’s approach of allowing each
county to forge its own path with respect to medical cannabis. Some counties issued
medical marijuana identification cards and countenanced sales by retail outlets, while
others aggressively arrested patients and caregivers.160 In 2003, California enacted
Senate Bill 420, which required counties to issue patient ID cards for eligible people
who wanted them, established a minimum amount of marijuana that all qualified
patients in the state would be permitted to possess, and authorized nonprofit co-ops
and collectives to grow and distribute marijuana for medical purposes.161 Although
this law was intended to create a more uniform statewide policy, local sovereignty
continued to result in a variegated jigsaw puzzle of regulations, enforcement
priorities, and cannabis markets. For example, while some California jurisdictions
explicitly banned marijuana retail outlets, Los Angeles County acquiesced to a
massive proliferation of storefront dispensaries, many of which tested the limits of
the words “medical” and “nonprofit.” A subset of high-caliber, professionalized
providers also sprouted up, both in places like Los Angeles and in more restrictive
counties. In 2009, the state started imposing a sales tax on medical marijuana
retailers—opening the faucet to a new stream of revenue to which California
lawmakers would soon become addicted.162
In sum, following the passage of Proposition 215, medical cannabis became an
indelible feature of California’s commerce and culture. Whether you were a
seriously ill person patronizing Imler’s dispensary in West Hollywood or a stoner

159 Matt Krasnowski, L.A.’s Prescription Pot Rebel: He Gets Along with Cops, COPLEY NEWS
SERV., Mar. 27, 1998; PERON & ENTWISTLE, supra note 1, at loc. 3518, 5054–65, 5264–73; Mary Curtius,
Activist’s Tactics Anger Many in Medical Marijuana Movement, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1997, at A3; LEE,
supra note 46, at 254–64; People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 (1997).
160 In the latter jurisdictions, medical marijuana users at least gained a new legal tool in 2002, when
the California Supreme Court ruled that the Compassionate Use Act gave defendants the right to challenge
the propriety of their indictment, in light of the medical-marijuana defense, in a pretrial hearing. See
People v. Mower, 49 P.3d 1067 (Cal. 2002).
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with a patient card scoring weed on Venice Beach, it was easy to forget that every
seller and purchaser of pot in the state was still violating federal law.

STATE-FEDERAL DIVERGENCE (1996-PRESENT)
Other States Follow California
California’s enactment of Proposition 215 in 1996 (along with Arizona’s passage
the same day of an even broader measure later declared void due to a technicality)
was a seminal moment in the evolution of American medical marijuana regulation.
The day after the election, Bill Zimmerman changed the name of his organization to
“Americans for Medical Rights” and vowed to press the issue throughout the
nation.163 Two years later, the people of Alaska, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and
Arizona (again) legalized medical marijuana, although the schemes they created
were generally more restrictive than California’s. Over the course of the next two
decades, state after state passed medical marijuana laws, some by initiative, some by
legislation, and one (Florida) by constitutional amendment.164 Almost every measure
that came to a vote passed. Today, medical marijuana is legal in 33 states and the
District of Columbia.165
With this wave of medical marijuana legalization measures, state law has simply
been catching up with American public opinion. When California passed Proposition
215, between 60 and 70 percent of the country already supported giving physicians
the right to prescribe marijuana (compared with only about 25 percent who favored
complete legalization).166 Ever since, polls have shown between 70 and 86 percent
support for medical cannabis.167
Despite Peron’s hesitation about using rights talk, post-Proposition 215 advocacy
statements in newspapers and online are replete with quasi-constitutional rhetoric.
Terminal patient Terry Stephenson, from Illinois, demanded his “constitutional and
God given right to use cannabis for medical purposes.” Steve Kubby, a prominent
California medical marijuana advocate on trial for drug crimes, wrote: “[E]veryone
is beginning to see that this issue is no more about marijuana than the Boston Tea
Party was about tea. This is about freedom, the Bill of Rights, and using juries to
force the government to obey those rights.”168 In honor of Independence Day, Larry
Nickerson of Texas invoked the “inalienable rights” of “Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness” enumerated in the Declaration of Independence and asserted
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that the government’s prohibition of medical marijuana constituted denial of “that
most basic right: life itself.”169

Federal Recalcitrance under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
Despite the spread of state-level medical marijuana legalization, medical cannabis
users have never felt completely safe from prosecution anywhere in the United
States. Pot remains illegal under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), regardless of
the reason for its use. Even the most protective state laws provide no protection from
a knock on the door by federal DEA agents.
The Clinton Administration did not modify its fierce anti-medical marijuana
stance following the 1996 passage of Proposition 215. Clinton’s drug czar, Barry
McCaffrey, swiftly issued a formal response to the enactment in which he
emphasized that the United States would continue to treat cannabis as both an illegal
Schedule I controlled substance and an unapproved drug prohibited by the FD&C
Act.170 (McCaffrey even threatened to revoke the CSA registration of any
practitioner who merely recommended medical marijuana—a policy later struck
down as infringing doctors’ and patients’ First Amendment rights.171) In 1998, the
federal government obtained preliminary injunctions shuttering six northern
California cannabis clubs, including Peron’s, for violations of the CSA.172 Although
Peron abandoned the dispensary business, the other defendants, led by the Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, would fight the injunctions all the way to the
Supreme Court.
Upon taking office in 2001, George W. Bush made marijuana a major law
enforcement priority. His administration continued its zealous pursuit of medical
cannabis-related cases even after the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001.173
On September 28, federal agents raided the rural California home of Dr. Mollie Fry,
a physician and medical cannabis advocate. She and her husband, an attorney, were
convicted of manufacturing and selling marijuana and sentenced to sixty months in
federal prison. Four weeks later, the DEA raided Scott Imler’s West Hollywood
dispensary, despite his assiduous efforts to comply with every jot and tittle of
Proposition 215—a development that likely provided Dennis Peron a good
chuckle.174
The most publicized medical marijuana enforcement action under Bush was
probably the 2002 arrest and prosecution of Ed Rosenthal. Rosenthal was a
California medical pot activist, horticulturist, and High Times Magazine columnist
who grew cannabis in an Oakland warehouse for distribution to medical marijuana

169 Larry Nickerson, Letter to the Editor, Life and Marijuana, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June
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no right more inalienable . . . than managing your own pain.”).
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Proposition 200 (Dec. 30, 1996) (on file with author).
171 Conant
172 U.S.

v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1998).

173 LEE,

supra note 46, at 295, 303, 309.

174 Id.

3.

v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 540 U.S. 946 (2003).

at 299–300; Bob Pool, Medical Marijuana Center in Mourning, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at

310

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 74

dispensaries. The federal trial judge refused to allow Rosenthal to introduce evidence
of the fact that the City of Oakland had deputized him to cultivate cannabis for use
by certified patients. The jury convicted him in January 2003 in a courtroom packed
with furious patients and activists. Soon afterward, when the jurors learned about the
excluded evidence, five of them held a press conference to rage at the court,
apologize to Rosenthal, and demand a new trial.175 Although the Court of Appeals
granted Rosenthal a new trial on different grounds, he was reconvicted in 2007.176
Meanwhile, the rescheduling struggle continued. In 2001, the DEA rejected a
rescheduling petition submitted in 1995 by former NORML National Director Jon
Gettman and High Times.177 On October 9, 2002, a group calling itself the Coalition
for Rescheduling Cannabis (CRC) filed still another petition. In 2006, the FDA
recommended once again that marijuana remain in Schedule I.178

The Emergence of Americans for Safe Access
Federal obduracy on medical marijuana in the early 2000s gave rise to a new
advocacy group, Americans for Safe Access (ASA). Steph Sherer, its founder, was a
young progressive community organizer and political consultant. She began using
medical cannabis in 2001 to treat disabling pain and spasms related to a severe neck
injury she incurred when a U.S. marshal muscled her to the ground at a World Trade
Organization protest in Washington, D.C. The next year, Sherer started ASA in
Oakland as a “patient’s rights” group modeled in part on the HIV/AIDS movement.
The organization focused from its inception on resisting federal medical cannabis
policy, although it also soon also became involved in state-level activism.
ASA swiftly became a large nationwide membership organization that engaged in
raucous street protests as well as litigation and lobbying. Its rhetoric was deeply
rooted in the American protest tradition. ASA’s posters featured the phrase “We the
people” and a Thomas Jefferson quotation on perpetual revolution. Its initial logo
resembled the Great Seal of the United States: a dove held a scroll containing the
words “liberty” and “compassion” while sitting on a shield bearing the image of a
marijuana leaf.179 Due largely to Sherer’s irrepressible drive, by 2007 ASA was
being mentioned in the media more than NORML.180

Courts on the Sideline
As has almost always been the case with respect to American movements for
freedom of therapeutic choice, the courts provided little help to medical marijuana
legalization advocates during this period. The California cannabis clubs closed by
the Clinton Administration sought to persuade the federal courts that an implied
175 Dean E. Murphy, Jurors Who Convicted Marijuana Grower Seek New Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2003, at A14; LEE, supra note 46, at 304–06.
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2007 WL 2012734 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2007) (order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial).
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defense of medical necessity should be read into the Controlled Substances Act’s
prohibition on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument in 2001, in U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.181
The following year, Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson, both of whom used
medical cannabis in compliance with California’s Proposition 215, filed a federal
claim seeking to enjoin the DEA from enforcing the CSA against them on
constitutional grounds. Monson cultivated her own pot within the state, while Raich
used state-grown pot her caregivers provided to her at no cost. The plaintiffs
contended that the CSA could not apply to such noncommercial, intrastate activity
without exceeding Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce pursuant to the
U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause. In 2005, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled against them. Gonzales v. Raich held that Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that the plaintiffs’ local activities affected interstate commerce
sufficiently to fall within the commerce power.182
Raich and Monson also contended that the CSA violated their rights under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed this issue on remand in 2007. Raich (now proceeding without Monson)
alleged that she had a fundamental, substantive due process right to “mak[e] lifeshaping medical decisions that are necessary to preserve the integrity of her body,
avoid intolerable physical pain, and preserve her life.”183 She based this argument on
a line of Supreme Court precedents recognizing rights to privacy and bodily
autonomy, including Planned Parenthood v. Casey (a 1992 case upholding Roe v.
Wade) and Lawrence v. Texas (a 2003 case declaring state anti-sodomy laws to be
unconstitutional).184
But the moment in the late 1970s when it seemed that courts might expand the
Roe holding into a full-blown right to medical choice had long passed. Fierce
academic criticism of implied rights jurisprudence had been accompanied by a series
of judicial opinions limiting substantive due process protections for medical
decisions. In 1980, the Tenth Circuit denied the existence of a constitutional right to
use laetrile. The court stated that although the abortion jurisprudence protected a
patient’s right to decide “whether to have medical treatment or not,” it did not
guarantee “his selection of a particular treatment, or at least a medication.”185 Seven
years later, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected
an asserted substantive due process right to physician-assisted suicide. The Court
held that unenumerated liberty interests were constitutionally protected only if they
were “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Assisted suicide failed
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this test because of the country’s longstanding, almost universal legal prohibition
against committing and abetting suicide.186
In light of Glucksberg, Angel Raich had no choice on remand but to contend that
medical marijuana use was “deeply rooted in [the country’s] history and tradition.”
The Ninth Circuit predictably rejected this assertion; after all, the use of marijuana
had been totally forbidden nationwide since the 1970 enactment of the CSA. But
Raich also advanced a more promising substantive due process argument based on
Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court’s 2003 sodomy decision. Lawrence had
ignored Glucksberg and instead applied a test asking whether there was an
“emerging awareness” that the right in question was fundamental. To demonstrate
that such an awareness was, indeed, “emerging” with regard to medical marijuana,
Raich pointed to the eleven states that had passed laws legalizing it by 2007. The
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that legal recognition of medical cannabis was “gaining
traction” but concluded that it had “not yet reached the point where . . . the right to
use medical marijuana is ‘fundamental.’”187 The court’s reasoning raised the
tantalizing possibility that as more and more states legalized medical cannabis, a
cognizable fundamental right might emerge. Until that time, however, elections, not
judges, would determine access to medical marijuana.

The Federal Government’s Wavering Approach Since 2009
In 2008, medical pot proponents had cause for optimism when Democrat Barack
Obama, an admitted inhaler, was elected President. The medical marijuana
community was further buoyed on October 19, 2009, when Deputy Attorney General
David Ogden circulated a memorandum to U.S. Attorneys serving in states that had
authorized medical cannabis use. The “Ogden Memo” instructed these prosecutors to
prioritize the pursuit of significant marijuana traffickers rather than “individuals
whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana.”188
Medical marijuana advocates were soon disappointed, however. In June 2011, the
DEA rejected the CRC rescheduling petition.189 One week later, Deputy Attorney
General James M. Cole issued a clarifying memorandum (“Cole Memo I”)
emphasizing that the enforcement discretion set forth in the Ogden Memo applied
only to patients and caregivers, not to businesses. In other words, federal prosecutors
should continue to bring CSA actions against enterprises—particularly “large scale”
ones—involved in the commercial cultivation, distribution, or sale of marijuana,
“even where those activities purport to comply with state law.”190 Federal agents
186 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721–23 (1997). The Glucksberg Court also demanded
that any substantive due process right be “carefully described,” thus ensuring that future medical
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subsequently raided two dispensaries in central California and a medical cannabis
farm in eastern Washington.191
During Obama’s second term, the federal government once again sent out more
tolerant signals regarding medical marijuana. In August 2013, Cole released yet
another memo, which walked back the severity of his first one. “Cole Memo II”
stated that federal marijuana enforcement would focus on eight listed priorities, such
as preventing distribution to minors and preventing the funding of criminal
enterprises through marijuana sales. Cole declared that except in instances in which
those priorities were threatened, the federal government would generally defer to
state law, including the law of states that had legalized medical or even recreational
marijuana.192 Then, after years of rejecting similar measures, Congress in 2014
passed the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, a subsequently renewed provision in the
annual omnibus spending bill that prohibited DOJ from using funds to prevent states
from implementing their medical marijuana regimes.193 At the very end of Obama’s
presidency, however, his administration manifested renewed ambivalence regarding
medical cannabis. The DOJ interpreted Rohrabacher-Farr narrowly and, until the
courts intervened, continued to pursue defendants despite their likely compliance
with state law.194 And in July 2016, the DEA rejected two additional marijuana
rescheduling petitions.195
Obama’s successor, Donald Trump, claimed as a presidential candidate to be “100
percent” in favor of medical marijuana.196 In January 2018, however, Trump’s
Attorney General Jeff Sessions threw the medical marijuana industry into a
temporary panic when he issued a memorandum rescinding the Ogden and Cole
memos.197 This move had little practical effect because Congress—over Sessions’
objections—had once again reauthorized the Rohrabacher-Farr (now the
Rohrabacher-Blumenauer) Amendment. Overall, the Trump administration has sent
mixed signals on the medical marijuana issue while essentially continuing Obamaera enforcement policies.198
The most dramatic federal actions regarding cannabis during the Trump Era
occurred in 2018. First, the FDA approved a cannabis-derived CBD drug
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(Epidiolex®) for certain forms of epilepsy.199 Then, with the Agricultural
Improvement Act of 2018 (the “Farm Act”), Congress embraced a new, bifurcated
approach to regulating cannabis in general.200 While preserving the Schedule I status
of “marihuana” under the Controlled Substances Act, the 2018 Farm Act
deschedules “hemp,” which it defines as Cannabis sativa L. containing no more than
0.3 percent THC (the principal psychoactive cannabinoid). The statutory definition of
“hemp” does not, however, similarly limit the amount of CBD, a non-intoxicating
cannabinoid widely studied and used for its medical (including psychological)
effects. Moreover, because the Farm Act’s dispensation for hemp covers derivatives
of the plant—including “cannabinoids”—the statute effectively deschedules CBD
derived from hemp. Congress thus opened the floodgates to the current deluge of
hemp and CBD products marketed directly to consumers as dietary supplements,
foods, cosmetics, and even drugs. In the FDA’s view, almost all of these products
remain illegal under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, but the agency
remains uncertain about how to exercise its regulatory power in this area.201
The proliferation of CBD products (and potentially other hemp extracts)
represents a potential threat to the whole-plant medical marijuana industry.
According to a 2017 National Academies review of the scientific evidence on the
health effects of cannabis and cannabinoids, the latter appear to have more promise
than the former.202 If a large portion of Americans seeking therapeutic benefits from
cannabis turn instead to cannabinoid extracts, the industry as a whole may follow the
path of Charlotte’s Web, a company that started life as a purveyor of whole-plant
medical marijuana but now sells only hemp-derived CBD products.203 After all, the
once-robust commerce in willow bark for treatment of pain and fever did not long
survive the identification and isolation of its active ingredient, salicylic acid (a
precursor to aspirin). Some medical consumers will doubtless always seek out
whole-plant marijuana for its amalgamation of hundreds of components, including
THC. But it seems likely that as sales of cannabis extracts increase, an ever-growing
proportion of people who smoke or eat marijuana buds and leaves will be doing so
simply to get high.

Federal Recalcitrance Reconsidered
Even following enactment of the 2018 Farm Act, THC-rich marijuana and its
derivatives remain as illegal as ever under the Controlled Substances Act. What
explains the federal government’s failure to budge on the rescheduling of marijuana,
under both Democratic and Republican presidents, even as states have moved in the
other direction? Cannabis proponents have long accused federal officials of basing
their marijuana policies on crass (if misguided) political calculation. Pure politics
may indeed explain why Congress has never rescheduled marijuana (as opposed to
hemp) by statute. Medical marijuana proponents have evaded this problem at the
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state level largely by presenting the issue directly to voters through initiatives—a
tool not available in federal law.
With respect to administrative rescheduling, however, a more benign explanation
is that the federal bureaucracy has approached the problem as a scientific one and
has followed the cogent recommendations of a scientific agency—the FDA. The
CSA requires any drug of abuse with “no currently accepted medical use” to be
placed in Schedule I. The DEA and FDA interpret this phrase as embracing the same
standards that the FDA uses to assess drug safety and efficacy in its approval
decisions. The relevant data for assessing drugs in the modern era are not doctor and
patient testimonials, but adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations.204 The
FDA has not ignored the available research but rather has concluded, accurately, that
the completed studies are not of the size and quality that would support NDA
approval. In 2015, in connection with recent rescheduling petitions, the FDA
performed a rigorous review of all clinical research on inhaled marijuana for
therapeutic purposes. The agency identified eleven completed Phase 2 controlled
investigations for various indications. While acknowledging that such research had
“progressed” since the agency’s previous literature review in 2006, and that the new
studies showed “positive signals,” the FDA reasonably concluded that they provided
only preliminary evidence of effectiveness because of their small size and the
inconsistency of doses delivered, among other issues.205
The government’s exclusively research-based interpretation of “currently accepted
medical uses” is, of course, open to criticism. After all, because the FDA does not
regulate off-label prescribing, many drugs have extremely widespread uses that have
never been systematically investigated. Indeed, the DEA itself does not generally
sanction physicians for prescribing Schedule II-V controlled substances for
unapproved indications so long as these prescriptions constitute “legitimate medical
purposes” and are not “outside the course of usual professional practice.”206
Undeniably, the medical community as a whole “accepts” many uses for drugs that
have not been supported by two adequate and well-controlled clinical studies.
Perhaps the DEA should interpret the phrase “currently accepted medical uses” in
the CSA to embrace such common uses—especially in a situation like marijuana’s,
where the lack of available patent protection may well prevent phase III studies from
ever being performed.
The FDA has another option available to provide marijuana access, at least to the
most desperate patients. The FDA can authorize the treatment use of investigational
drugs (including Schedule I substances) by seriously ill patients with no satisfactory
alternatives.207 Indeed, as we have seen, a compassionate IND program was in effect
for marijuana until the first Bush Administration terminated it. The FDA could
restore and greatly expand this program. The FDA similarly invoked scientific
values to defend its initially conservative approach to AIDS drugs, until simple
compassion impelled it to reform its policies. Perhaps it is time for the agency to
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consider a similar approach to medical marijuana, at least with respect to extremely
serious conditions.
Federal regulators should also keep in mind a core strand of medical freedom
ideology throughout American history—freedom of inquiry. Medical cannabis
advocates have long decried the Catch-22 they are trapped in; the government
refuses to reschedule marijuana without further research while simultaneously
making such research onerous or impossible. A 2015 Brookings report, Ending the
U.S. Government’s War on Medical Marijuana Research, confirmed this “circular
policy trap,” ascribed it to “statutory, regulatory, bureaucratic, and cultural barriers,”
and blamed it for the absence of “research freedom” in this area.208 The report
recommended rescheduling cannabis under the CSA, ending the NIDA monopoly on
legal production of marijuana for research, and reopening FDA’s compassionate use
IND program. Bipartisan coalitions have recently sponsored legislation
implementing the first two recommendations in both the House and the Senate.209
However, if it is valid to ask whether federal law and policy are too tough on
medical marijuana, it is also valid to ask whether some states are too lenient. Since
1996, state after state has legalized medical cannabis with far less proof of safety and
efficacy than Americans generally demand for medical products. Some, like
California, do not even limit legal use to serious conditions. Why should pot be
subject to lower scientific standards than other drugs? Those who embrace this
position seem to rely largely on the argument that the government should not
interfere with cannabis use because it is a “natural” product. As medical marijuana
user Terry Stephenson declared, “Cannabis has a lot of therapeutic effects and is less
harmful to the body than manufactured drugs by a pharmaceutical company. It is
bound to be; it is organic and put on earth by God and Nature.”210 Permissive state
medical marijuana laws reflect the same American cult of the “natural” that explains
the relatively lax regulatory regime for dietary supplements. Supplements are not
smoked, however, nor do they have psychoactive effects. Science-based marijuana
policy should not simply ignore these safety questions.
Of course, if the United States ever legalizes marijuana for non-medical uses, and
pot becomes available to all, the details of medical marijuana policy will become
largely irrelevant—like medical alcohol policy at the end of prohibition. Indeed,
perhaps no phenomenon presents a greater challenge to both medical marijuana
regulators and medical marijuana activists than does the burgeoning legalization of
recreational marijuana.

MEDICAL MARIJUANA IN THE AGE OF LEGAL RECREATIONAL
POT
In November 2010, California nearly became the first state to legalize marijuana
for nonmedical uses. By a margin of only seven percentage points, voters rejected
Proposition 19, an initiative that would have allowed local governments to authorize
the retail sale of marijuana for recreational use and to regulate and tax these
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transactions. A surprising group joined law enforcement and anti-drug organizations
in opposing the initiative; some (though hardly all) medical cannabis patients, sellers,
growers, and advocates. They dominated a web-based advocacy group, “Stoners
Against Proposition 19,” which contended that the measure would harm patients.
One vociferous member of this informal organization was none other than Dennis
Peron. He asserted that legalization of “recreational” marijuana simply made no
sense because all cannabis use is medical.211
Proposition 19 advocates were apoplectic over this opposition from within the
marijuana movement. NORML’s blog charged medical dispensary owners who
opposed the initiative with having an “I gots mine” attitude.212 The website “Loopy
Lettuce” accused Peron of trying to suppress new competition for his “pot friendly”
bed and breakfast in San Francisco.213 These intra-movement tensions exploded at
the International Cannabis and Hemp Expo held in San Francisco in September
2010. The previous Expo had been a mellow celebration of public toking. This one
devolved into near-chaos.214 After the election, legalization proponents blamed the
initiative’s defeat on a “greedy, reactionary . . . fifth column within the medical
cannabis community.”215
Two years later, on November 6, 2012, the citizens of both Colorado and
Washington State, by comfortable margins, voted in favor of measures that legalized
the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana for recreational purposes
purchased from state-licensed dispensaries while also taxing such sales and imposing
various restrictions.216 Many medical pot advocates fervently and noisily resisted
these initiatives, particularly in Washington. They denounced that state’s I-502 as a
pathetic, less-than-halfway measure that would expose patients to DWI charges and
prohibit personal cultivation.217 The conflict between the medical and recreational
camps continued following the initiative’s passage, as the Washington legislature
debated how to structure the state’s new non-medical cannabis distribution system.
Americans for Safe Access organized a campaign called “Health Before Happy
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Hour” to inform politicians that “the needs of patients are much different from those
of recreational marijuana users, and they will not be easily brushed aside.”218
Since 2012, eight more states and the District of Columbia have legalized
recreational marijuana—in each case despite resistance from some in the medical
marijuana community.219 One of these states is California, which in 2016 easily
passed Proposition 64 (the “Adult Use of Marijuana Act”), despite opposition from
medical cannabis proponents, including Dennis Peron, by then a cannabis farmer in
rural Humboldt County.220
As we have seen, tensions have existed between proponents of medical
legalization and recreational legalization (I will call them Medicals and
Recreationals) for at least a quarter of a century. But the recent comprehensive
legalization measures have elevated the acrimony to new levels. The Recreationals
are obviously most infuriated by some Medicals’ active opposition to full
legalization. They are also, however, indignant about the calculated passivity of
many other Medicals with respect to this cause. ASA’s official policy, for example,
is not to take a position on the legalization of recreational use, while warning
policymakers “against letting the debate surrounding legalization of cannabis for
recreational use obscure the science and policy regarding the medical use of
cannabis.”221 In the opinion of ex-NORML chief Allen St. Pierre, ASA’s stance is
based not on principle, but on the goal of protecting the material interests of its
dispensary-owner members, whose business model is threatened by the rise of
recreational pot retailers.222
To many Recreationals, this position is not only selfish and ungrateful, but also
positively harmful. Many embrace the “Box Canyon” theory of medical marijuana,
which, as explained by cannabis blogger and podcaster Russ Belville, “means that if
you fight only for medical marijuana, your marijuana will become only medical.”223
Inevitably, Belville explains, “tighter and stricter forms of medical marijuana laws
are passed to appease the powers that wish marijuana prohibition to continue.”224
Recreationals thus fear that “medical only” advocacy will inadvertently bring about a
highly regulated “medical only” future that even most medical marijuana advocates
(at least those outside pharmaceutical companies) would despise: FDA regulation,
production controls, inventory caps, distribution limits, prohibition of home
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cultivation, elimination of high-THC products, and, potentially, the total abolition
smoked whole-plant pot.225
The rancor runs in both directions, however. Despite the Recreationals’ longtime
support of medical marijuana, the Medicals have long been skeptical about their true
motives. Many think that Recreationals support medical marijuana legalization only
as a stepping stone to full legalization, and that they do not actually care about
patients. To make this point, Medicals frequently invoke NORML founder Keith
Stroup’s ill-phrased assertion in a 1979 interview that his organization would use
cannabis treatment of cancer patients as a “red herring to give marijuana a good
name.”226 Their suspicions were stirred up again in 2012, when Allen St. Pierre was
quoted on the Celebstoner.com website as describing the medical cannabis industry
as a “political and legal farce” and “sham.” Though St. Pierre explicitly stated that he
was not demeaning medical marijuana itself, this subtlety was lost on many enraged
Medicals.227
But those Medicals who have resisted comprehensive legalization have not done
so merely out of pique. Rather, they believe that legalization of recreational use will
have negative consequences for medical marijuana sellers and users. Most
fundamentally, medical marijuana dispensaries and growers fear economic ruination
from competition with the major corporations (akin to big tobacco or big alcohol)
that are likely to dominate the emerging recreational markets.228 This concern is
particularly powerful in states that establish unified medical-recreational distribution
and retail systems, such as Washington. Recreational legalization in Washington
resulted in the closure of hundreds of medical dispensaries. Colorado, by contrast,
tried to mitigate this phenomenon by preserving a dual-track system and by giving
existing medical dispensary operators priority in applying for recreational licenses.
Indeed, Colorado’s medical cannabis industry remained relatively stable following
full legalization.229 But more recently, Colorado has seen a drop in medical
cardholders parallel to that in other full legalization states, as patients avoid the
hassle and cost of obtaining such cards by shopping in the recreational market
instead.230
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In the eyes of many Medicals, the disappearance of dedicated medical marijuana
shops through absorption into recreational retailers will harm patients as well as
merchants. First, they argue, recreational stores are unlikely to stock the specialized
strains and products needed by small classes of patients. Second, the employees of
such establishments will probably be less qualified to advise patients about medical
cannabis use. Third, many Medicals believe that the interiors, exteriors, and
neighborhoods of recreational stores have a “head-shoppy” (and even dangerous)
aura rather than the serious, controlled, medical atmosphere preferred by many
patients.231
In those jurisdictions that legalize recreational marijuana, ASA and its allies
believe that the preservation of a distinct legal regime for medical marijuana is
essential. States legalizing recreational marijuana since 2012 have embraced a “tax
and regulate” approach similar to that imposed on the liquor and tobacco industries.
They have done so with the acquiescence of the recreational marijuana lobby, which
understands that guarantees of revenue and control are necessary for passage of
comprehensive legalization measures. The industry pays high sales and excise taxes,
while the state imposes strict limits on, for example, purchaser age, the amount of
cannabis per purchase, “home grow,” and driving while intoxicated. Medicals
maintain that while the “tax and regulate” approach may be suitable for vices, it is
utterly inappropriate for medicine. They argue that if the same high taxes are
imposed on medical cannabis as on recreational weed, patients will find the drug
unaffordable—and medical dispensaries will lose a price advantage they need to
survive in competition with recreational outlets. Medicals further contend that it is
unfair for the state to impose the same restrictions on patients (who use cannabis by
necessity) that it imposes on recreational consumers (who use it electively). Finally,
they believe that a distinct regulatory regime must be established for medical
cannabis so as to provide patients access to insurance coverage and protection from
discrimination.232
Time is likely on the side of comprehensive legalization, as poll after poll shows
increasing support for this policy. One reason for this trend is that the marijuana
policy preferences of more and more Americans, particularly people of color, are
shaped primarily by the ineradicable racial discrimination that characterizes the
enforcement of drug laws. Until quite recently, much of the African-American
community resisted the conclusion that the drug war’s disproportionate impact on the
black population justified elimination of marijuana prohibitions. For example, in the
mid-1970s, black politicians in Washington, D.C. rejected a bill to decriminalize
cannabis possession, even in the face of data showing that the marijuana laws were
selectively enforced against African-Americans. Most black government officials
and pastors, and the bulk of the city’s black population, concluded that marijuana use
harmed the African-American community in ways that outweighed other concerns.233
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Attitudes started to shift in the early 1990s, however, largely because of growing
awareness of the ruinous consequences—both direct and collateral—that
discriminatory marijuana prosecutions had on black people. Nevertheless, even as
late as 2010, the California NAACP faced fierce opposition from black religious and
community leaders when it supported Proposition 19, the failed initial measure that
would have legalized recreational marijuana.234 Michelle Alexander’s bestseller The
New Jim Crow, published the same year, helped turn the tide by detailing the drug
war’s devastating effect on African-Americans.235
In November 2014, Washington, D.C.’s residents, by a 70% to 30% margin,
passed an initiative fully legalizing the use and cultivation of small amounts of pot—
a more radical measure than the decriminalization bill rejected four decades earlier.
Although white Washingtonians supported the initiative at a higher rate than their
black counterparts, a healthy majority of African-American voters (about 58%) also
favored it.236 And in 2016, when Californians overwhelmingly passed Proposition
64, legalizing recreational marijuana, African-Americans favored the measure at a
rate higher than any other group.237 Both jurisdictions had previously legalized
medical cannabis. But to Americans who view marijuana policy primarily through
the lens of racial justice, a “medical only” regime is patently inadequate, for it still
permits discriminatory prosecution of people of color. As minority communities add
their support for comprehensive legalization to the already robust support among
whites, other “medical only” states will likely join the ten that currently permit
recreational use of marijuana.
NORML founder Keith Stroup is not alone in predicting that “we are approaching
a time when medical use laws will become irrelevant to the marijuana legalization
movement. Once marijuana is legalized for all adults, there is no need for a medical
use law.”238 Allen St. Pierre similarly opines: “I don’t think the distinction between
medical and recreational marijuana will hold up.”239 When Robert Randall
commenced his fight in the mid-1970s, who could have predicted that forty years
later, the greatest threat to a thriving medical cannabis industry would not be
prohibition, but rather full legalization?
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